Runway Safety is one of IATA Safety priorities, with growing concerns over both the number of excursion and incursion events. Whilst recent events have not always led to catastrophic outcomes, they serve as timely lessons, which should not be ignored, marginalized, or cast aside as isolated events. It was welcomed that SIRM #32 Senegal captured the essence of improving runway safety with several presentations, discussions and workshops related to the topic, which will be covered in this post.
The SIRM was opened with a Runway Safety session, covering predominately the threats and issues surrounding Runway Excursion events. It generated a number of insightful conversations regarding the challenges of implementing robust mitigations, particularly regarding the relationship between ATM/ANSP and Crews. Challenges were discussed and identified that timely communication of weather patterns and the changing or adverse condition of the runway surface would be a benefit to the crews and help them during the critical stages of flight.
Air Traffic Management (ATM), airports, aircraft manufacturers, and regulators all have a role to play in reducing the risk. So, what did the meeting delegates consider and discuss? A workshop was conducted which covered threats to incursion, excursion, the challenges being faced in the cockpit and the potential mitigations that we should be considering at a global and regional level.
Runway Excursion Threats
The group was tasked with exploring the threats related to runway excursion, they discussed a vast array of options and determined that most relating to the Africa region were the following:
- Energy Management/unstable approach.
- ATC aircraft performance knowledge – this was multifaceted with considerations also made to pilot needs, it was discussed that “shortcuts” offered by ATC were not always beneficial in the approach and could contribute to an unstable approach. Staff churn was explored along with the post covid experience gaps, which could be seen as contributory to poorly considered decisions and requests born from a lack of understanding of aircraft performance.
- Cultural challenges – Particularly relating to the execution of a go-around, it was identified that there may be more tendency to execute a landing from an unstable approach than to opt for the go-around. There are many drivers relating to this, including the slow implementation of just culture and the need for maturing safety systems.
- Capacity and growth – While growth should be viewed as a positive indication, it introduces challenges of capacity, both on a human and infrastructure level. It was challenged that some airports and in particular the layout of some aerodromes are not designed to meet the demand, this can lead to rushing of crews to meet slot or landing requirements. Equally, the growth challenges the capacity of the ATC unit, which may not have the tools, equipment, knowledge, or experience to meet the huge demands and pressure being placed on them.
- Infrastructure – The challenges of infrastructure were discussed, and this mainly focussed on the conditions of runway surfaces across the region, which contribute to poor braking events. Serviceability and effectiveness of weather aids were also deliberated, which in the view of the group should at the very least, be in adherence to the required standard.
Runway Incursion
A group was tasked with discussing the threats relating to Runway Incursion events, they determined that most relative to Africa were:
- Wildlife and Human Intrusion – In a number of areas, there is a lack of adequate perimeter fencing and, in some cases, none at all. This leads to both intrusion by wildlife and humans onto the operating areas. This is a challenging area and has consequences across the aviation system, including degradation of firefighting services. The group discussed a number of underlying causes including the lack of adequate signage, in many cases basic signage could offer a base level of mitigation to human intrusion. It was identified that where there is a lack of perimeter fencing, a surveillance system could be used to ensure that intrusion events are detected prior to the critical stages of flight, however these are also lacking.
- Communication – Arguably, this is one of the most fundamental and basic facets of the aviation environment, but one of the most effective when conducted in a standardised, unambiguous way. Poor communication standards are a global concern, particularly when it comes to runway incursion events. Ground-Air communications, or, in fact, any communication conducted between the aircraft crew and ATC/ANSP is such an important step in incident prevention but has become, over the years, diluted by local nomenclature. It was discussed how communication issues can lead to confusion over clearances and taxi instructions. Standardised phraseology should be reinforced at all levels, by all aviation parties, from crews to regulators. The reasons as to why communication standards and principles have degraded were considered by the group and a number of factors were identified:
- Language barriers.
- Human factors errors induced from the effects of workload, fatigue, stress etc.
- Inadequate or rushed training.
- VIP/Humanitarian/military flights not adhering to standard civil process and procedures.
- Radio Communication Interference – This has become a little more common in recent months, with spurious RT calls across the Africa region, this could result in either incorrect or illegitimate instructions being followed, or an inability for ATC to issue instructions in a timely manner due to interference.
- A lack of low visibility procedures was also highlighted along with weather conditions leading to low visibility and surface contamination.
The Cockpit Environment
Along with the two systemic discussions, a third group discussed the challenges being faced in the cockpit when it comes to the runway safety risks. They addressed and considered the following:
- Crews unaware of runway surface conditions which may lead to inadequate braking.
- Crews are being challenged in the approach phase of flight by requests from ATC which are not achievable, particularly relating to aircraft performance, this was highlighted by the group discussing runway excursion events in terms of controller competency and experience. Crews need to feel empowered and encouraged to reject instructions which could impact the safety of the approach.
- CRM – There was a discussion into the dynamics being experienced in the cockpit, particularly relating to the desire and demand for smooth landings and the impact of vastly differing seniority/experience levels in the cockpit. It was identified that imbalances of seniority levels on the flight deck may lead to a lack of challenge, particularly where stabilized approach criteria were not being met. This was quite a complex discussion, particularly where factors such as time pressure, crew resource, and fatigue were considered, however, it was clear that there is potential for organizational factors to impact the crew’s willingness to execute a go-around.
Mitigations
The final group were tasked with assessing mitigations to runway safety events, they were free to explore a number of areas and were not restricted to runway incursion or excursion. The group considered and discussed the following:
- The reinforcement of Runway Safety Teams (RST), it was the view that the importance of having RSTs could not be understated, it was expressed that these should be present at all domestic airports and be formed with the most credible stakeholders from across the aviation system.
- Enhancements to training – Training was considered as an essential tool to creating a systemically harmonized and safe operating environment which looks to minimize risk with standardized methods. The strengthening of training was considered across the ATM cadre, the pilot community, firefighting services, and ground handlers.
- Communication standards – These were identified throughout the SIRM as deficient, however the issue is not just limited to verbal communications, NOTAMs, for example, were also considered as deficient, particularly when it came to nav/approach aid outages, runway restrictions (e.g., displaced threshold), construction work, etc. Linked to the training item, it was also considered that the less experienced members of the aviation workforces would benefit from bespoke training on understanding NOTAMs and other related aviation “jargon”.
- As the parallels between safety and security become clearer it should become paramount that considerations be made by airports and regulators as to whether airport safeguarding, an ICAO requirement, is really at the standard expected. Airport safeguarding should ensure the safety of aircraft arriving and departing from an airport and this should include the considerations of preventing unwanted intrusion to operating areas which should be free from public intrusion.
- Airlines could consider recurrent engagement sessions with ATM and ANSPs.
- Arguably, an effective surveillance program would prevent further degradation of services and enforce the need for improvement to meet the international standards as defined by ICAO. Whilst the culture and accepted normalizations will take time to change, this should not be a blocker to demanding improvements and progress.
Call to Action - Industry
- Operators, Airports and Authority bodies should pursue the creation of RSTs and drive the development of proactive workplans.
- Operators should routinely review safety risk assessments for the airports in which they operate, taking care to cross check Significant Safety Concerns.
Call to Action – IATA
- IATA will continue with to develop safety models relating to Runway Safety and share with the industry.
- IATA will review whether they can provide a platform to proactively share Significant Safety Concerns in one harmonized accessible location.
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